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The human being can be regarded as a product of evolution. She
has prevailed in the evolutionary process because of her ability to cre-
ate and to use knowledge. The creation and the use of knowledge
depend on the cognitive and on the social order. Both types of or-
der are interdependent. Hayek sought to analyze the principles of
both types of order. In particular, he based his analysis on three re-
search disciplines: Evolutionary Epistemology, Cognitive Psychology,
and Systems Theory. In this article, we recapitulate and revise his
respective analysis. Hayek’s approach thus appears as particularly
sustainable and powerful.
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1 Introduction
According to Hayek, our social interaction is mainly characterized by how
we create and use knowledge. Basically, knowledge is something that is
created by our nervous systems. Each nervous system is a separate entity. It
follows its own purposes and uses its own ’language’. Therefore, knowledge
cannot be directly transmitted. To transmit parts of our knowledge, we need
some code. A code represents a set of rules which describes correspondences
between two different languages; where ’language’ is conceived in a broad
sense. Such a set of rules creates order. Hayek describes ’order’ as ”a state
of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related
to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial
or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the
rest, ... (Hayek, 1973, p. 36).” Thus, social order allows any member of
a respective group to form correct expectations about the interaction with
others. The specific structure of a social order depends on the individual
knowledge of each member. The individual knowledge of a member depends
on the order of his nervous system.
Hayek considers our nervous system as an evolutionary product. In the
process of evolution, it has developed in interaction with its specific envi-
ronment. Major parts of this environment have always been social groups.
Major tasks of the nervous system have been to carry out cognitive functions.
Hence, it depends on the process of (social) evolution how we perceive, clas-
sify, memorize, think, reason, decide, and speak; how we create and use
knowledge. In sum, there appear various interdependencies between the cog-
nitive and the social order. To better understand these interdependencies,
it seems indispensable to follow an interdisciplinary approach. In our field,
issues of economics, sociology, psychology, and biology overlap. In the fol-
lowing, we are going to look at how Hayek encountered this urgent scientific
challenge.
2 Hayek on Cognition, Social Interaction, and
Science
2.1 The Cognitive Order
Hayek starts his analysis of the cognitive order from the following basic ques-
tion of psychology: Why do we sometimes perceive similar physical stimuli
as different, or different physical stimuli as similar? - Discrepancies between
the physical object and our perception become particularly conspicuous with
respect to configurations. Within such configuration, we may perceive two
similar shapes as different, or two different tones as similar. Hence, our
nervous system seems to follow some particular rules. These rules do not
perfectly correspond to the structure of the physical object.
In his analysis of cognition, Hayek distinguishes three specific worlds:
1. The external physical world: It contains our environment and its stimuli
on us.
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2. The nervous system: This is the world in which we receive, transmit,
and transform the stimuli.
3. The mental world: Here, we organize our thoughts and behavior.
Hayek states that the orders of world 3 and 2 are isomorphous, but not
those of the world 3 and 1. Thus, discrepancies between the physical object
and our perception can arise. Hayek defines isomorphism as ”a structural
correspondence between systems of related elements in which the relations
connecting these elements possess the same formal properties (Hayek, 1952b,
p. 38).” He points out that this definition does not refer to real spaces.
Two distinct elements may therefore occur on identical positions. A system
consists of its elements and their relationships. The whole may be more than
the mere sum of its parts.
Hayek thus conceives the mind as the order within world 3, which relates
to world 2 and to 1, in distinctive manners. He seeks to answer the following
two questions: How do the relationships between the mind, the nervous
system, and the external physical objects arise? How do these relationships
work?1
Hayek examines the nervous system as a part of our organism. He consid-
ers the organism as a product of evolution. In order to prevail, any organism
has to adapt to its environment. The process of adaptation is characterized
by two components: a phylogenetic and a ontogenetic one. In the phyloge-
netic process, the organism seeks to prevail as a member of its species. Its
behavior is based on its genetic structure. Greater changes of this structure
can only be reached by reproduction. Normally, an organism can only re-
produce by the combination with another one of the same species. In the
ontogenetic process, the organism seeks to prevail as an individual. It guides
its behavior along individual needs. The behavior can be changed, at any
time. Nonetheless, it is not independent of the organism’s genetic structure.
The external world of an organism changes over time. The organism
is thus confronted with various types of stimuli. Hayek describes the basic
principle of its response, as follows: In the phylogenetic and in the ontogenetic
process, the organism learns to construct a system of differentiations between
stimuli. Each stimulus is classified; which means that it is assigned to a
certain place in an internal order. The place depends on the significance that
the stimulus seems to have for the organism. Classification is thus a process
in which stimuli are discriminated, transformed and grouped. Stimuli belong
to the same class, if they provoke the same response. The instrument by
which the organism performs its classification is the nervous system. Hence,
1See Hayek (1952b), chapters 1 and 2.
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Hayek finds two major reasons why the order of world 2 is not isomorphous
to world 1: First, the capacity of the organism to adapt is limited. Second,
the nervous system classifys the stimuli according to its own criteria, based
on the needs of the species and of the individual organism.2
The nervous system is guided by the mind. The mind adapts the experi-
ences to the organism’s needs. It compares and evaluates the substances and
the structures of the experiences. Thus, the elements may be reclassified.
The classes represent different levels of abstraction; they may create linkages
with each other. While the classes are a priori to the experience, the linkages
are a posteriori. The mind is able to treat a substance, only if it fits to at
least one of the classes. It always reclassifys an element with respect to the
other existing substances and the linkages between their classes. Hayek thus
considers the mind as a creator of order. It orders experiences in an active,
tentative, selective, cumulative, and abstract manner.3
The mind seeks to guide the nervous system such that the whole organ-
ism can prevail in its environment. Therefore, any mental order is oriented
towards the action of the organism; the mind creates dispositions to act.
To make an action meaningful, the mind has to generate expectations. The
expectations represent provisional hypotheses. New and contradicting ex-
periences lead to adaptations, to reclassifications. The reclassifications are
determined by the former experience and the current needs of the organism.
For this reason, the order of world 3 is not isomorphous to world 1.
An expectation will be the better, the more the relevant patterns of the
mental order equal the patterns of the external physical object. Hayek de-
scribes the degree of equality between the two patterns by the term ’un-
derstanding (verstehen)’. The mind seeks to understand its environment.
It searches for similar patterns under various circumstances. However, the
mental process is only partly conscious. Our intellect can modify the circum-
stances only to the degree to which the respective mental process is conscious.
Hayek concludes that our intellect can never fully control (the consequences
of) our actions.4
2.2 The Social Order
For a human being, key objects of world 3 are normally other human beings.
Thus, human beings meet each other as physical objects. One nervous system
perceives the action of another. One mind seeks to understand another.
2See Hayek (1952b); Bouillon (1991).
3See Hayek (1952b, 1979b).
4See Hayek (1952b, 1967a, 1982).
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To adapt their actions to one another, the human beings need to develop
common rules. They need to learn to understand the meaning of actions.
According to Hayek, a human being starts each learning process by form-
ing a provisional hypothesis. Then, she compares this hypothesis with her
respective perception. She abstracts the patterns of the perceived actions.
The fitting parts of the patterns are adopted; the unfitting parts are rejected.
The human being consolidates the new patterns by a modified imitation of
the perceived behavior. Much of this general learning process happens un-
consciously. Hayek states that a human being will be the more able to un-
derstand another, the more both share in their phylogenetic and in their
ontogenetic developments.
As a major instance for the principles of human understanding, Hayek
describes the ability of small children to learn a language. A language is
a key instrument for a human being to set stimuli to others, to exchange
information. She gets the conditions to learn a language in the phylogenetic
process; she can actually learn it in an ontogenetic process. In the life-time of
a human being, the conditions change somewhat. A small child perceives the
phonems, morphems, words, and sentences from other human beings. She
abstracts the patterns of the stimuli; she imitates them in a modified way.
Thus, her own language adapts to the given rules, from the more general
to the more specific ones. Most of this concrete learning process happens
unconsciously. As a result, a human being will often be able to correctly
use the grammar of her own language, although she is not able to explicitly
explain this grammar.5
To stabilize exchange, human beings join together in groups. A group is
characterized by specific rules and specific purposes. A group member mainly
learns the specific rules in the process of exchange with other members. He
adapts his action patterns to the norms of the group. At the same time, his
related actions feed back to the norms of the group. A member will hardly be
aware of all the rules and purposes which characterize his group. He simply
seeks to participate in an order, in the best way he can. The causes and the
effects of this order may exceed his intellect.
Hayek distinguishes two general types of order: First, the artificial or-
der: This type is exogenous; it follows particular purposes and thus becomes
concrete, simple, and certralized. Second, the spontaneous order: This type
is endogenous; it follows general purposes and thus becomes abstract, com-
plex, and decentralized. According to Hayek, the two types tend to generate
different effects, mainly because the second allows each participant to inte-
grate more of his particular knowledge. The spontaneous order is able to
5See Hayek (1967b).
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coordinate more varying action patterns. It coordinates interaction in a less
direct way. It also allows each participant to make use of the others’ knowl-
edge. Thus, each can use much more knowledge than he possesses by himself.
Hayek explains this difference between the artificial and the spontaneous or-
der by the ’fact of our irremediable ignorance’: Particular knowledge can
hardly be transferred, in a conscious, direct, and comprehensive manner. No
central entity can gather all particular knowledge and deliberately channel
this knowledge into specific and consistent rules.6
A group as a whole is characterized by a specific order. The order bases on
a system of rules of action. The functional form between the two also depends
on the external conditions. Thus, it may be possible that different systems of
rules produce similar orders, or that similar systems of rules produce different
orders. A specific order does hardly arise in the way that the group members
intend. They even may be unaware of the really existing order. What matters
for each member is whether he can follow certain purposes. The purposes
can only be reached by the group as a whole. Hence, the preservation of
the group does rather depend on the overall order than on specific rules of
action.7
In the process of instituional evolution, groups need to adapt to changing
environments. According to Hayek, a system of rules of action can only
survive, if it makes the group as a whole more successful than others. Groups
compete for membership. If a member can better reach his own purposes in
a different group, then he will withdraw. Nonetheless, to join a different
group also means that he must learn new rules and thus give up old action
patterns. The adaptation takes place on various levels of consciousness. The
institutional evolution thus selects between different specific orders. The
objects of such selections are social groups and not individuals.8
A human being may participate in several groups; the groups may differ
in size and in order. Moreover, each group is characterized by specific rules
and purposes. But, the rules and purposes of different groups may stand in
conflict with one another. Not any combination of memberships is possible.
As a group member, a human being adapts her behavior to the specific
rules. The adaptation may happen consciously or unconsciously. A conscious
adaptation impresses on the human being’s intellect; an unconscious one on
her instincts. Thus, a human being may become part of several traditions.
The traditions may change in the process of institutional evolution.
In the history of institutional evolution, the human being started as a
6See Hayek (1973), ch. 2.
7See Hayek (1967c).
8See Hayek (1973), ch. 1.
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member of a tribe. Such a tribe was a small group in which the members
stood in face-to-face relations with each other. The dominant norms within
such a group were altruism and solidarity. The individual actions were co-
ordinated by an artificial order. In later stages of the history, new types
of groups appeared. These types were rather characterized by: anonymity,
self-interest, formal contracts, and a spontaneous order. The new types often
conflicted with a human being’s instincts. Hence, human beings initially re-
acted with resistance. However, the new types mostly prevailed because they
allowed their members to be more successful. They could integrate more dif-
ferent actions and more different knowledge. As Hayek remarks, the human
beings’ intellects were rather formed by the institutional evolution than the
other way round.9
2.3 Tasks of the Empirical Sciences
The main task of all empirical sciences is to describe and explain the world.
However, it appears to be unclear how the world should be conceived. Hayek
divides between three types of worlds: the external physical world, the ner-
vous system, and the mental world. The three worlds interact with each
other; they all participate in an evolutionary process. But, world 2 and 3 do
not need to be isomorphous to world 1. According to Hayek, the fact of the
basic heteromorphism should guide the scientific work. All sciences get the
task to revise the classifications of our mind from the ordinary experiences.
Very often, things are not what they simply seem to be. The sciences should
help our mind to classify any experience as a particular instance of a general
rule. Nevertheless, the objectives and methods of the natural sciences need
to be clearly distinct from those of the social sciences.
In Hayek’s normative conception, the natural sciences seek to adapt the
classifications of our minds to the patterns of the external physical world.
World 1 is given as the primary object. The natural sciences thus deal
with ’objective’ data, only. They try to describe and explain world 1 as it
really is. In order to allow our minds to adapt to the patterns of world 1,
they develop instruments and languages which extend the capacities of our
nervous system. Thus, our mind can make experiences which do not belong
to world 2, by itself. The systematic testing of our experiences becomes
independent of the particular patterns of world 2. Hence, the natural sciences
neglect particular products of the human mind, such as value judgements or
emotional connections.10
9See Hayek (1976, 1983); Hayek (1988), ch. 1.
10See Hayek (1952a), part 1, ch. 2.
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The social sciences deal with the human being and her relations to other
human beings or to things. The central feature of the human being in this
context is that she appears as being able to choose. Hence, the course of her
relations seems to be open. What a human being chooses, depends on her
mental order. The mental order also contains opinions. Such opinions may be
false in the sense that their patterns do not correspond to given respective
patterns of world 1. Nevertheless, they can determine the human being’s
choice, and thus have real effects in world 1. Things may become what she
thinks they are. Hence, the social sciences deal with both: ’objective’ and
’subjective’ data.
A social scientist may be able to explain a human being’s relations to
the degree that he shares identical structures with her mind. The structures
of the mind are formed in the phylogenetic and in the ontogenetic process.
Therefore, a precondition for the social sciences is that the scientist and his
object belong to the same species. Moreover, the explanations can be the
better, the more identical the patterns of the experiences are that both have
made. One major tool to adapt the patterns of the experiences is the human
language. Nevertheless, our concrete knowledge about human beings and
their relations must remain limited. One major reason is that many of our
choices happen unconsciously. This holds for the scientist as much as for
his object. Social actions thus will never base on a consistent and coherent
body of knowledge. However, we usually can observe some order in social
interactions. According to Hayek, the central task of the social sciences
becomes to explain the principles of a social order. The central question is:
How can individual actions, based on dispersed and imperfect knowledge,
lead to consistent social results?11
Typically, economists describe and explain social results by an equilibrium
concept. In the classical concept, the individuals have constant preferences
and all the relevant knowledge. Hayek regards these assumptions as totally
unrealistic. The scientific problem thus becomes one of mere logic. In the
real world, the individuals have imperfect knowledge; relevant conditions
change. Nevertheless, each individual forms specific expectations about her
social environment. She plans her social action. In the social interaction, the
individual expectations and plans meet each other. It can be seen whether
they conform or conflict. Hayek distinguishes two sources of conflicts: First,
endogenous disturbances: They arise from the preferences and knowledge
of the involved individuals. Second, exogenous disturbances: They arise
from the specific environment of the social interaction. Anyway, conflicts
will lead to revisions of the expectations and plans. Thus, the description
11See Hayek (1952a), part 1, ch. 3.
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and explanation of real social interaction requires a dynamic concept. For
Hayek, the revelant questions are: Does there exist a tendency towards an
equilibrium in which the relevant expectations and plans can be fulfilled?
Why does there (not)?12
According to Hayek, any real problem in the social sciences arises due to
the fact of evolution. In the evolutionary process, knowledge changes in a
dispersed, spontaneous manner. In a spontaneous order, the knowledge tends
to become more complex. Now, the central question for the social scientist
is how to deal with the rising complexity. Hayek states that the scope for
statistics is quite limited. Statistics deal with aggregates. These aggregates
abstract from smaller, individual changes. A statistician uses to justify this
abstraction by the ’law of large numbers’. However, Hayek believes that
this law does not apply to the evolution of knowledge. The spontaneous
order induces systematic and not unsystematic changes. Therefore, the best
a statistician can reach is a correct description and explanation of some
general social pattern.13
Efforts to describe and explain the world should not be made for their
own specific purposes. Scientists should seek to contribute to a ’better’ social
order. In ’modern’ societies, a central role to improve the social order is
assigned to the political system. However, Hayek finds many strong inherent
reasons why a political system tends to follow its own specific purposes.
Democratic rules in various forms can hardly channel political action into the
direction of the overall social purposes. Political agents tend to believe in a
’rationalist constructivism’. Such a conception maintains that all institutions
which support the common purposes can be constructed in full awareness of
their effects. Hence, the political agents try to replace spontaneous orders by
artificial ones. They stipulate some exogenous rules which force the group
members to adopt particular behavioral pattterns. Some specific knowledge
is excluded from the interaction. However, the crucial problem is that such
specific knowledge may be the source of the group’s success. The political
agents may (without awareness) weaken the position of the whole group in
the institutional evolution. Therefore, Hayek suggests a further task for the
social scientists. They should teach any individual the limits of her own
knowledge. In particular, they should teach the political agents to what
degree political actions are really forseeable. This way, the political agents
might become more cautious, change less but better follow the purposes of
the group as a whole.14
12See Hayek (1937, 1945).
13See Hayek (1945, 1967a).
14See Hayek (1979a, 1967d, 1974).
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3 Revisions and Extensions
Hayek was born in Vienna (Austro-Hungarian Empire), in 1899. He grew
up in a social environment which was characterized by an intense, diverse,
scientific dynamic. His grandfathers were prominent scholars in the fields of
statistics and biology. His father was a doctor and a close friend of Eugen von
Bo¨hm-Bawerk (economist). On his mother’s side, he was a cousin to Ludwig
Wittgenstein (philosopher). In 1918, Hayek started his academic career at
the University of Vienna. He inscribed for law and political science, but also
studied philosophy, psychology and economics. He worked at: the Monakow’s
Institute of Brain Anatomy, New York University, the Austrian Accounting
Office (issue: debts of war), and the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle
Research. In 1929, Hayek became a professor and held lectures in economics,
at the University of Vienna. Two years later, he left Vienna to join the
London School of Economics.
Thus, Hayek developed a broad scientific base. He firmly believed that
such a broadness was needed to advance in the analysis of specific social
scientific problems. According to him, the social sciences deal with the re-
lations of human beings to other human beings or to things. Human beings
are generally free to choose. Thus, human relations may get influenced by
subjective conceptions; which can make them extremely complex. The high
potential for complexity implys the necessety for interdisciplinary research.
In Hayek’s analysis of the interdependencies between the cognitive and
the social order, three disciplines play a major role, namely: Evolutionary
Epistemology, Cognitive Psychology, and Systems Theory. Hayek became
already acquainted with each of them in the early years of his studies in
Vienna. At this time, each of them was still in its infancy. Hayek received
sustaining inspirations: by his friend Karl Popper in Evolutionary Episte-
mology, by the ’Gestalt school’ in Cognitive Psychology, and by his friend
Ludwig von Bertalanffy in Systems Theory. These inspirations became cor-
nerstones of his related analysis, until his death in 1992. However, each of
the three disciplines has evolved much more broadly, until today. It seems
expedient to integrate some of their further aspects into the analysis. In the
following, we are going to take up this task.
3.1 Evolutionary Epistemology
Evolutionary Epistemology bases its statements on a central postulate which
is called ’hypothetical realism’. Hypothetical realism describes a distinct
ontological position. It contains five major assumptions: First, there exists a
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real world; its existence is independent of our consciousness. This assumption
helps to explain, for instance: why human beings may understand each other
and coordinate their actions, by communication; why different (scientific)
methods may lead to similar results. Second, the real world is consistently
structured. Thus, we become able to understand the world; our actions can
follow some purposes. Third, the real world and the mind interact. Due to
this, structures of the two distinct worlds can adapt to each other. Fourth, the
mind is a product of the nervous system. In order to understand the content
of our mind, we therefore have to analyze the structure of our nervous system.
And fifth, all our knowledge about the real world must remain hypothetical.
This already follows from the fact that we cannot prove any of the other
assumptions.
Evolutionary Epistemology conceives ’knowledge’ as an internal recon-
struction of external objects. We understand an external object to the de-
gree that the related structure of our mind is isomorphous to the structure
of the object. Thus, understanding is a creative process of our mind. A
central question of the Evolutionary Epistemology is, how our mind has be-
come able to create isomorphous structures. In other words: Why may the
subjective structures of human knowledge fit the objective structures of the
real world?15
All our knowledge is created by our nervous system. Our nervous system
carrys out an internal reconstruction of external objects that it encounters
in its environment. The structure of our nervous system is a result of evo-
lution. Evolutionary Epistemology distinguishes two types of evolution: the
biological and the cultural one.
In the biological evolution, the nervous system is also subject to the prin-
ciple of ’mutation, selection, retention’. Any organism seeks to survive and
reproduce. In order to succeed, the organism has to adapt to its environ-
ment. The structure of the organism is determined by its genes. Thus, the
adaptation process starts with the mutation of a gene. The mutation may
directly affect the nervous system, or not. Evolutionary Epistemology sup-
poses that such a mutation is ’blind’; which has two implications: first, it
does not follow a specific plan; second, it does not have an impact on any
other mutation. Thus, the organism encounters its environment in a changed
structure. If the new structure better fits the environment, then the organism
may survive and reproduce. This way, the genes are selected and retained.
The biological evolution proceeds rather slowly; the possibilities for an or-
ganism to succeed are rather limited. Evolutionary Epistemology therefore
maintains that the chances for the human being to survive have been very
15See Vollmer (1985); Vollmer (1975), part B.
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special.
In the cultural evolution, our nervous system is guided by our mind. The
principle of ’mutation, selection, rentention’ is transferred from a genetic to
a mental level. This means in particular that mutations are not blind, any-
more. Now, they do follow a specific plan; and one does have an impact
on another. The mind can adapt to its environment by changing the or-
ganism’s behavior. The mind can learn by the principle of ’trial and error’.
Evolutionary Epistemology describes the learning process by the following
scheme:
P1 → TT → EE → P2.
Thus, the mind encounters a problem (P1); it contrives a tentative theory
(TT) to solve this problem; the theory is tested and errors are eliminated
(EE); from the solution of this problem arises a new problem (P2). According
to Evolutionary Epistemology, this scheme basically forms and infinite chain.
Hence, it is inexpedient to ask which comes generally first: the theory or the
experience. Instead, an earlier tentative theory always guides an experience;
and thus gets revised. The basic structure of all our theories is derived
from the structure of our nervous system. Therefore, the biological evolution
penetrates into all our knowledge. This also implies that an individual mind
guides his learning process towards the evolutionary success of his organism.16
However, evolutionary success does not necessarily imply ’truth’. Our
nervous system is limited in its scope and imperfect in its functioning. In the
biological and cultural evolution, it may thus pay off for an individual organ-
ism to behave just opportunistically. Nevertheless, our moral consciousness
pushes us to search for the truth. Hence, Evolutionary Epistemology calls
the truth a ’regulative idea of the sciences’. It characterizes the truth by
correspondence and consistency. We may approach the truth, if we open
our theories for a critical discussion. Thus, our theories become conscious
and intersubjective; they are tested and compared. Basically, the sciences
follow the same learning scheme as the individual mind. But, the sciences
can control and correct each other. This will actually work the better, the
more there exists a critical and constructive attitude towards errors. Inter-
disciplinarity may help to support such an attitude and to effectively find
errors. Nevertheless, errors are also costly. To avoid unreasonable costs, sci-
entists should make their tests in a gradual manner. Thus, they can help
other human beings to better adapt to a changing environment.17
16See Popper (1972), ch. 3; Popper (1975); Campbell (1987).
17See Popper (1935); Vollmer (1985); Radnitzky (1983, 1987).
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3.2 Cognitive Psychology
Cognitive Psychology deals with how human beings internally transform and
use information. Some of its main areas of reasearch are: perception, think-
ing, memory, learning, decision making, and consciousness. The entity which
carrys out all cognitive functions is the nervous system. Cognitive Psychol-
ogy examines the nervous system’s related operations. The examinations are
guided by various core concepts. One of these concepts is that of ’mental rep-
resentations’. A mental representation is an internal code for information.
The concept assumes that all cognitive functions base on such representa-
tions. Internal codes determine how we perceive, think, memorize, and so on.
Another core concept is that of ’architecture’. It assumes that all cognitive
functions base on the architecture of the nervous system. Each subsystem
is assigned a specific operation. The result of an operation depends on the
nervous system’s physical substances and design.
A cognitive psychologist disposes of a wide range of methods to better un-
derstand how human beings internally transform and use information. The
research methods can be classified along two dimensions: internal versus ex-
ternal, and controlled versus uncontrolled. One external and uncontrolled
method is introspection. According to this, the researcher observes his own
cognitive behavior, possibly guided by self-experiments or meditation. Ad-
vantages of this method stem from its directness; disadvantages from the in-
fluence of unconscious operations. Today, the most widely used internal and
controlled methods are ’neurorecording’ or ’neuroimaging’. Such methods in-
corporate technology to create external scientific records or images of internal
mental operations. They measure for instance: anatomical structures (X-ray
computed tomography, magnetic resonance imaging); blood flows (positron
emission tomography, functional magnetic resonance imaging); or chemical
reactions (electroencephalography). Their advantages stem from the deep-
ness and the intersubjectivity of the observation; their disadvantages from
the unnatural experimental environment.18
Cognitive functions are carried out by the nervous system. The nervous
system consists of a specific structure of subsystems. On the highest level of
this structure, we have the central (CNS) and the peripheral nervous system
(PNS). The CNS transforms and transmits all information within the whole
organism. It is composed of the brain and the spinal cord. The basic elements
of the CNS are the neurons. Neurons are information transforming and
transmitting cells. They may connect with each other via synapses. Inside
a synapse, one neuron may send a signal to another. The signal can be
excitatory or inhibitory. Only if the excitatory signals exceed the inhibitory
18See Galotti (2004), ch. 1; Kellogg (2003), ch. 1.
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ones, in a specific period, the receiving neuron does react. Thus, a basic
code inside the CNS is that of an excitatory or inhibitory chemical, the so-
called ’neurotransmitter’. The CNS is connected to the other parts of the
whole organism via the PNS. The PNS is composed of the autonomic nervous
system (ANS) and the skeletal system (SKS). The ANS controls the smooth
muscles and some glands; which in general happens unconsciously. The SKS
controls the striated muscles; which in general happens consciously. The
basic elements of the PNS are the nerve fibres.19
The structure of our nervous system is a result of evolution. According
to well founded estimations, animals evolved the first brain cells 700 million
years ago; and the first brains 250 million years ago. In the evolutionary
process, a rudimentary human brain appeared only 3 million to 4 million
years ago; the modern human brain only 100,000 to 200,000 years ago. Out
of all species, the modern human being has the largest brain. Our CNS
contains around 1 trillion (1012) neurons and around 1,000 trillion (1015)
synapses. It is most probably the most complex system on earth. Due to
our nervous system, we have been able to adapt, to prevail, and to develop
various cultures.20
Nevertheless, our nervous system is far from being perfect in the sense
that it does not represent, by itself, the external physical world as this world
really is. Cognitive Psychology has discovered, described and explained many
instances of such imperfection. In our context, two major respective fields
are: perception and decision making.
The central task of our nervous system in perception is to treat the stimuli
from the environment such that our mind can give them a meaning. What
our nervous system does is to transform and to classify the stimuli. Then,
our mind seeks to recognize patterns in this classification. In the process
of pattern recognition, the mind uses two basic methods: ’data-driven’ or
’theory-driven’. According to the data-driven method, the mind focuses on
special parts of the transmitted data, as for instance: edges, lines, corners,
or intersections. Then, it combines these parts to a whole. According to
the theory-driven method, the mind starts with some expectations in the
form of a theory. Then, it selects special parts of the transmitted data to
test the theory. In each perception, both methods are involved. Which of
these dominates, also depends on the object’s characteristics; how difficult
it is to perceive, for example. One basic problem of our mind in perceiving
visual objects is to distinguish them from their backgrounds. The ’Gestalt
school’ stated the following: Out of all possibilities to combine visual data
19See Kolb/ Whishaw (2001), chapters 2-5.
20See Kolb/ Whishaw (2001), ch. 1.
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to a whole, to a ’Gestalt’, our mind tends to select the simplest and most
stable one (’law of Pra¨gnanz’). However, it seems not to be the case that
the real external world tends to create its objects in the simplest and most
stable form.21
The central task of our nervous system in decision making is to collect, to
evaluate, to restructure, and to select action related information. Typically,
a decision making process can be divided into five stages: 1) set goals; 2)
gather information; 3) contrive alternatives; 4) structure decision; 5) make
final choice. Surely, the process may sometimes leap backwards before it
reaches stage 5. A decision can generally be considered as rational, if the
mind chooses the alternative which best satisfies the given goals. However,
cognitive psychologists observed and analyzed many instances in which a
human being does not behave rationally. The human mind tends to deviate
the more from rationality, the more risk or uncertainty is involved in the
decision. Cognitive psychologists assign such deviations to categories, as for
instance:22
• Availability heuristic: The probability estimation of an event is based
on how easily the related information can be retrieved.
• Representativeness heuristic: A given outcome is supposed to represent
a typcial characteristic of the related process.
• Anchoring: Initial outcomes dominate final choices.
• Framing: Alternatives are evaluated as positive or negative changes
from the current state.
• Sunk cost effect: Lost investments dominate decision in a new context.
• Hindsight bias: Exaggeration of certainty which could have been as-
sumed, previously.
• Confirmation bias: Focus on information which can confirm initial ex-
pectation.
21See Galotti (2004), ch. 2.
22See Galotti (2004): ch. 12.
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3.3 Systems Theory
Systems Theory defines a system as a set of elements which are related in
a specific mode. This means that these relationships are supposed to be
more intensive in a certain respect than others. Hence, the set of elements
is sourrounded by certain boundaries. The boundaries describe the relevant
differences between a system and its environment. The environment contains
all elements that the system is related to in a different mode. The system thus
constitutes a whole that depends more on the internal than on the external
elements. The system constitutes a functional unity.
Elements relate to others in order to generate specific functions. In a func-
tion, the value of one variable depends on the value of other variables. In a
given system, an element may belong to various subsystems. Each subsystem
carrys out a specific subfunction. Each subfunction may be constrained. This
means that the range of a variable under the given conditions is less than
under other conditions. Hence, a system becomes limited in its operations;
the constraints determine how the system cannot relate to its environment.
The set of remainig alternatives is described by the term ’contingency’. More
precisely, contingency describes a system’s degrees of freedom in its internal
operations. For related systems, it constitutes a source of uncertainty or even
conflict.
To reduce uncertainty or to solve conflicts, systems may communicate
with one another. In a communication, two related systems seek to exchange
information. To give the information a meaning, the two systems need a
common code. Systems Theory defines a code as a set of rules or a map-
ping which establishes a correspondence between the symbols of two distinct
languages. To maintain all the information from the sender to the receiver,
the code must establish a one-to-one correspondence. With a one-to-many
or a many-to-one code, by contrast, information is lost. Then, the receiv-
ing system classifies the information according to its own specific linguistic
structure. To control the meaning of the communication, the two related
systems may give feedback to one another. This means that the re-classified
information flows back to the initial sender. Generally, negative feedback re-
duces the deviations of meaning, and thus stabilizes the relationship; positive
feedback has the opposite effects.
Hence, communication may generate order in the relationships between
(sub-)systems. The sender restricts the domain of meanings for the receiver.
The receiver can select its input only within this domain. The input deter-
mines its operation. The sender thus controls the receiver, in some sense. The
relationship further constraints the operations of both integrated systems.
In Systems Theory, a system which produces something different from
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the own elements and relationships is called ’allopoietic’. Its operations thus
directly depend on the conditions within the environment, on the ’state of
nature’. By contrast, a system which is oriented towards the reproduction of
itself is called ’autopoietic’. Surely, a system can never be merely autopoietic.
It always needs the interaction with an environment, at least for the input of
energy or information. But, internal and external relationships are selected
by some internal rules. The autopoietic system is thus independent in the
control of some subsystems. It can stabilize itself in a circular process.
A system, no matter if allopoietic or autopoietic, may develop emergent
characteristics. Systems Theory describes those characteristics as emergent
which arise from the system as a whole, but not from its elements in isola-
tion. Hence, emergence is the product of a system’s selective relationships;
internal or external ones. It causes the whole to be more than the sum of
its parts. While ’emergence’ describes this effect in qualitative terms, ’syn-
ergy’ describes it in quantitative ones. Synergy is the quantitative difference
between the product of a system and the product of its subsystems. The
difference can be positive or negative.
A general characteristic of a system is its complexity. Systems Theory
describes complexity as the extent of relationships, their embeddedness and
entanglement. Embeddedness refers to the density of relationships with other
systems. Entanglement refers to the dependence on other systems. The more
complex a system is, the more uncertain are its operations, the more extensive
are the potential conflicts with its environment. Therefore, complexity incurs
an equivalent degree of communication and constraints. The overall order
needs to adapt to the different complexities of the involved systems.
The evolution pushes a system towards a higher degree of complexity.
Since the environment changes, the system needs to change its relationships
in order to maintain its functions. It thus becomes more contingent. A
higher contingency of interrelated systems can be coordinated in a higher
complexity. However, a system may seek to keep its internal structure. As
a result, it would have to select its external relationships more selectively.
Its boundaries would become stricter. Systems Theory examines evolution
under five major aspects: the principle of mutation, selection, retention; its
stochastic; its opportunistic; its autopoietic; and its autocatalytic nature.23
Based on Systems Theory, the nervous system can be regarded as a au-
topoietic system. One can show that the nervous system is, in its essential
character, operationally closed. It forms an autonomous unity of subsystems
which seek to stabilize the functions of the whole while they adapt to exter-
nal changes. The subsystems carry out a function by an interaction of states
23See Bertalanffy (1968); Willke (1993).
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of relative neuronal activity. One and the same function may be carried out
by various subsystems in various contexts. The potential contingency of a
nervous system stems from this variability. Constraints to the contingency
are built by the nervous system’s organic structure; which is a result of the
evolution. More precisely, the organic structure is determined by its genes in
the phylogenetic process, and by its interactions in the ontogenetic process.
Thus, the nervous system deals with a continuous recursion of representa-
tions. For its mode of operation, it does not matter whether a representation
was internally or externally generated. Various representations may be com-
bined and transformed. Altogether, the nervous system refers to itself.24
Only if a system is self-referential, it can interact with external objects
without loosing its operational autonomy. Moreover, a system may need
the interaction with external objects in order to carry out specific functions.
Nevertheless, changes of the external objects lead to perturbations in the
system’s operations. In order to stabilize its operations, it must become
more selective, then. Hence, in the process of evolution, a system tends to
become more complex. It only can maintain its operational autonomy, if it
adapts its control mechanisms.
A central issue of Systems Theory is how various control mechanisms
work within a system of organized complexity. The Theory distinguishes at
least five essential characteristics of organized complexity:
1. The relationships between the systems are non-linear. Causes and ef-
fects are therefore difficult to determine.
2. In general, the system is sluggish; it hardly responds to external inter-
ventions.
3. The system has some sensitive spots. If these spots are touched, the
whole system responds, excessively.
4. The system is operationally closed. It thus develops a higher internal
complexity; more operations become internal.
5. The system relys on specific internal control mechanisms. Such mech-
anisms make the external operations intransparent and uncertain.25
There are two major reasons why modern social systems have to deal with
organized complexity in particular ways: first, the speed of their evolution is
particularly high; second, they seek to enforce particular moral values. Thus,
24See Maturana/ Varela (1984): ch. 7; Maturana/ Varela (1980): part 1, ch. 4.
25See Willke (1994), ch. 2.
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a modern social system faces the problem to integrate highly differentiated
subsystems, to coordinate highly contingent behavior. We can find a great
variety of control mechanism in a modern social system. One type of such
mechanisms bases on various symbolic systems, as for example: language,
power, money, or expertise. However, the effect of each symbolic system
depends on its specific environment. One symbolic system can be a part of
another one’s environment. An adequate control mechanism is thus difficult
to find and to install. Nevertheless, there appear three basic principles for
the respective rules: generality, abstraction, and decentralization.26
4 Summary
Hayek developed a far-reaching approach to describe and explain the interde-
pendencies between cognitive and social order. From a today’s perspective,
some outer parts of this approach need to be revised or extended. In particu-
lar, current insights from Evolutionary Epistemology, Cognitive Psychology,
and Systems Theory help to further increase the descriptive and explanatory
power of Hayek’s approach. Thus, the main statements of the revised and
extended approach can be summarized as follows:
Cognitive order arises in our nervous system. The nervous system carrys
out all cognitive functions, as for instance: perception and decision making.
It is most probably the most complex of all existing systems. The nervous
system consists of a specific structure of subsystems: CNS, PNS, brain, SKS,
forebrain, cerebellum, and so forth. The basic elements of the CNS are the
neurons. Neurons are information transforming and transmitting cells. They
may connect and communicate with each other via synapses. The structure
of such connections is quite flexible. Hence, the nervous system carrys out its
functions by activating various subsystems. There arise specific patterns of
activity. Information is classified and reclassified according to these patterns.
As a whole, the nervous system has the goal to support the survival and re-
production of the respective organism. It seeks to control its basic operations
without reference to its environment. On a basic level, many operations thus
become circular. The nervous system stabilizes such circularity by selecting
external relationships according to internal rules. Hence, the nervous system
can be regarded as autopoietic and self-referring. Based on its complexity,
the nervous system generates various emergent characteristics. Its opera-
tions reveal more than the sum of its involved subsystems. In relation to
its environment, the nervous system appears as highly contingent. There
26See Willke (1993), ch. 4; Willke (1995), part 2.
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thus exists a high potential of conflict between them. The nervous system
has learned to adapt to its environment in the course of evolution. In the
phylogenetic process, it adapts by its genetic structure; in the ontogenetic
process, it adapts by its neuronal patterns. The basic principle of learning is
the same in both processes:
P1 → TT → EE → P2.
However, while in the phylogeny, variations of TT happen ’blindly’, in the on-
togeny, they happen expediently. Hence, there always may exist discreprep-
ancies between the structure of the nervous system and the structure of its
environment; between world 2 and world 1. In decision making, the following
categories of discrepancies, for example, may become apparent: availability
heuristic; representativeness heuristic; anchoring; framing; sunk cost effects;
hindsight bias; and confirmation bias.
Social order allows the members of the respective group to coordinate
their actions. Human beings join groups to satisfy certain needs, to stabi-
lize the exchange with other members. A group is characterized by specific
rules and specific purposes. A group member mainly learns the specific rules
in the exchange with other members. He adapts his action patterns to the
norms of the group; his related actions feed back to the norms of the group.
Each learning step follows the principle of trial and error. This may happen
consciously, or not. The success of the exchange depends on the degree to
which the member assign similar meanings to certain actions; to which they
understand each other. Individuals can the better understand each other, the
more they share in their phylogenetic and in their ontogenetic developments;
the more they share in their cognitive and in their behavioral patterns. There
can arise two general types of social order: The artificial one is exogenous,
concrete, simple, and centralized. The spontaneous one is endogenous, ab-
stract, complex, and decentralized. The two types of order tend to generate
different effects, mainly because the second allows the members to integrate
and to use more knowledge. This is because of the ’fact of our irremediable
ignorance’: Particular knowledge can hardly be transferred, in a conscious,
direct, and comprehensive manner. No central entity can gather all particular
knowledge and deliberately channel it into specific and consistent rules. In
the process of instituional evolution, a group needs to adapt to its changing
environment. A system of social rules can only survive, if it makes the group
as a whole more successful than others. This is because groups compete
for membership. In the process of institutional evolution, the environment
tends to push a group towards a higher degree of complexity. In response,
the members need to adapt their action patterns, the group as a whole needs
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to adapt its rules, its control mechanism. However, such adaptations may
stand in conflict with the involved instincts, traditions, intellects.
Any real problem in the social sciences is due to evolution. Due to evolu-
tion, a human being has to adapt her cognitive and her behavioral patterns
in order to succeed in the pursuit of her own purposes. The central question
is: How can individual actions, based on dispersed and imperfect knowledge,
lead to consistent and beneficial social results? Thus, the central task of
the social sciences becomes to describe and explain the principles of a social
order. In this task, the social scientists also follow the basic learning prin-
ciple (P1 → TT → EE → P2). As specialists, however, they are supposed
to develop and use more precise methods. To reach a higher precision, they
have to obey to some overall scientific rules. The most important one is that
they make their theories intersubjective. Based on intersubjectivity, the the-
ories can be discussed. A discussion will be the more fruitful, the more there
exists a critical and constructive attitude towards errors. Interdisciplinarity
will strengthen such an attitude and help to find errors. From the social
sciences’ central task, two further tasks can be derived. First, to revise some
inadequate cognitive pattern. In its representation of the real world, our
nervous system partially tends to deviate. A change of a deviating pattern
may help us to better adapt our behavior to the real changes in our environ-
ment. Second, to revise some inadequate social rule. A social order need not
by itself reconcile the particular purposes of the members with the general
purposes of the whole group. A change of a deviating rule may help us to
better follow the general purposes. For the success in both tasks, it appears
as essential to recognize the limits of our knowledge.
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